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Abstract
This paper analyses the level of inequality in Spain and how it evolved over the course
of the past crisis and the early stages of the current recovery. To this end, it first
introduces the various dimensions of wage, income, consumption and wealth inequal-
ity, and studies how they have developed. The analysis shows less wage dispersion
in Spain than in other comparable economies, even after the crisis years, while the
surge in unemployment during the period resulted in a high level of inequality in per
capita income. The level of inequality in Spain is more moderate when total gross
household income is analysed, decreasing during the crisis as a result of pensions
developing more favourably than other sources of income, in conjunction with young
people delaying setting up home. Inequality in per capita consumption rose during the
crisis, particularly as a result of a decrease in expenditure on consumer durables by
low-income households. Wealth inequality exceeds income inequality and increased
during the downturn as a result of financial assets outperforming real assets. Neverthe-
less, Spain’s wealth inequality is moderate by international standards, as ownership
of real assets is more widespread than in other countries. The way inequality has
evolved during the early stages of the current economic recovery shows that falling
unemployment has enabled a reduction in wage income inequality, as well as in per
capita income inequality, albeit to a lesser extent.
We are indebted to all seminar participants at the Banco de España in particular to Óscar Arce and Pablo
Hernández de Cos. We are very grateful to Virginia Sánchez Marcos and Manuel Bagues for their work in
improving the paper during the editorial process. We also thank the assistance of Sandra Laza, Ana
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and analyses are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of
the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.
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1 Introduction
Since the onset of the crisis, income inequality has increased inmanyOECD countries,
including Spain. In fact, this has been a focal point of academic analysis in the past few
decades and,more recently, has appeared on the agendas of various national authorities
and international organizations.
Unlike other advanced economies, Spain has not witnessed a sustained rise in
inequality in earnings, income or wealth over recent decades. In particular, when wage
income, household income and wealth are studied over the period from the mid-1980s
to 2008 a decrease in inequality is even apparent.1 However, the evolution in earnings
and income inequality in Spain is highly countercyclical. Particularly in the lower part
of the distribution, earnings and income dropped considerably during downturns and
rose during economic booms.2
This paper analyses the level of inequality in Spain and how it evolved mainly over
the course of the past crisis. First, it introduces and links the concept of inequality in
different dimensions: wage, income, consumption and wealth inequality in Spain (see
Appendix 1 for a detailed description). Analyzing different dimensions of inequality
is important to understand the functioning of various insurance mechanisms available
to individuals and households linking the abovementioned concepts as suggested in
Blundell (2011). Themotivation of this latter paper was the notable increase in income
and consumption inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom during the
last 40 years. Instead, our motivation is the relatively high level of income per capita
inequality in Spain compared to other countries and the notable increase of income
and wealth inequality in Spain during the last recession. Our results suggest that the
high level of inequality in terms of gross income per capita in Spain compared to
other countries is related to the high incidence of unemployment and the relatively
low level of effective hours worked while occupied among those individuals with low
earning potential. On the contrary, hourly wage differentials are not particularly high
in international standards. Moreover, despite having a progressive tax system, Spanish
direct taxes do not change the international ranking of Spain when comparing gross
and net income per capita inequality. As expected, consumption inequality is lower
1 Goerlich andMas (1999) document a decrease in inequality in household and per capita incomes in Spain
between the mid-1970s and the early 1990 s based on data from the Household Expenditure Survey (EPF),
while Pijoan and Sánchez-Marcos (2010) confirm a drop in inequality in earnings and household incomes
between 1985 and 2000, based on EPF data and the EU households panel. For their part Bonhomme and
Hospido (2017) analyse the drop in inequality in earned income between 1988 and 2007, while Arellano and
Bover (2013) find a slight increase in household income inequality between 2000 and 2008 at the bottom
end of the distribution and a decrease at the top end. Stability in terms of wealth has been documented in
Martínez Toledano (2017).
2 See Pijoan and Sánchez-Marcos (2010), Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2012), Carrasco et al. (2015) and
Bonhomme and Hospido (2017).
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than income inequality. Interestingly, following the approach in Basso et al. (2017) and
Arellano et al. (2017), we find that this fact partly reflects the high mobility of income
at the two tails of the distribution. Finally, unsurprisingly, wealth inequality greatly
exceeds income inequality. The abovementioned income dynamics partly explains this
fact via the greater accumulation of wealth by high income households since wealth
accumulates year after year. However, when looking at the asset portfolio of different
segments of the population, it is also clear that wealth inequality cannot be explained
only by different saving behavior but also fromdifferences in the returns of the different
assets in the households’ portfolio by wealth decile. The fact that in Spain real estate
asset holdings are substantial even in the portfolio of richer households makes Spanish
wealth inequality relatively low in international standards. In this regard, we confirm
that the bias towards homeownership is a factor leading to lower wealth inequality as
in Kaas et al. (2017) and Kindermann and Kohls (2016).
Second, our paper presents an analysis of how inequality evolved during the crisis
in Spain. Similarly to Blundell (2011) we contribute to the literature of how house-
holds were able to insure themselves against the big financial crisis and how those
mechanisms varied by age and wealth. One particularly interesting result is that the
crisis affected individual labour earnings inequality by changing the effective hours
worked of particular segments of the population (youth and low skilled) instead of
their relative hourly wages. This is consistent with the evidence in other European
countries that most of the adjustment was done in a context of nominal wage rigidities
(Babecký et al. 2012). This fact, coupled with the increase in unemployment affecting
mostly youth, low tenured and low skilled, disproportionately increased inequality
in income per capita. The paper shows that some households changed their living
arrangements to partially insure the shock. In particular, the paper presents some evi-
dence that low income households decreased their fertility rates [as in Adsera (2011)
and Barceló and Villanueva (2018)] and that children in unemployment delayed their
emancipation from their parental household as in Kaplan (2012). We also find a sec-
ond earner effect increasing the household labour supply as in Ortigueira and Siassi
(2013). However, it does not appear to be effective since the high assortative mating
results in characteristics of both partners in a couple to be similar, reducing the effec-
tiveness of that search for new jobs [as in Dolado et al. (2017)]. As in Blundell (2011)
we show that public transfers were important to cushion the income negative shock.
On the one hand, earnings coming from the unemployment subsidy disproportion-
ately enter in the low end of the income per capita distribution. On the other hand,
pensions, that are countercyclical, were important to maintain the income at the low
end of the total income distribution. The government also increased the proportion-
ality of direct taxes but the effect of this measure on inequality appears to be very
low. In terms of consumption, we find, as in Blundell (2011) that the biggest changes
were in durable goods for households with lower per capita consumption. Moreover,
wealthiest households were better able to maintain their level of consumption in the
face of falling income up to a certain age. Indeed, in those households headed by a
person over 55, wealth barely plays an important stabilizing role. Finally, the paper
documents that wealth inequality grew significantly during the crisis. This seems to
be related to the important drop in the average value of real assets (more concentrated
in the lower part of the income distribution) as in Wolff (2018).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the different data sets that
are used for the analysis. Section 3 discusses the findings regarding inequality in 2014
in terms of wage income, household income, consumption and wealth. In Sect. 4 the
evolution of inequality in all of these dimensions over the last recession period is
described, whereas in Sect. 5 a brief account of the evolution of inequality during the
recent expansionary period is provided. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Data
Weuse several datasets. Appendix 2 briefly presents the characteristics of the data used
and how the main variables of interest have been constructed. The main data source is
the Survey of Household Finances (EFF), conducted by the Banco de España, which
provides information on wages, income, consumption and wealth. One limitation,
however, is that the data set concludes in 2014.
Despite the fact that the EFF allows researchers to do both an analysis at the individ-
ual and the household level, when analysing individual earnings, the paper extensively
uses the microdata of the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey (EES). This is the case
because EES has more precise information on the effective hours worked allowing for
a better estimation of hourly wage per worker. Note, however, that EES and EFF have
sampling differences that are important for the interpretation of inequality figures. In
particular, individual income inequality is much higher in the EFF than in the EES for
the same year, especially during the crisis. This is the case mainly because the EFF
sample is representative of all the population (including persons who are employed,
unemployed and inactive at the time of the survey), whereas the EES data refer only
to persons who have been working throughout the month of October of the year of
reference. One advantage of using the EFF and the EES is that for both of them there
exists a comparable European dataset. In the case of individual earnings, the informa-
tion available refers to the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) released by
Eurostat, the design of which is similar to the Spanish survey. In the case of house-
hold income, consumption and wealth we use the European Household Finance and
Consumption Survey3 (HFCS).
In Appendix 3 we present robustness results for the period 2008–2014, both for the
cross section and the longitudinal analysis, using different data sets. In particular, the
paper uses the annual Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA) wage data, converted to
monthly frequency, for full-time employees; the monthly wages of workers working
the whole week in the fiscal module of the Continuous Sample of Working Histories
(MCVL) conducted by theMinistry of Employment and Social Security; and the Euro-
pean Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset, published
by Eurostat, that allows a comparison of total and per capita income across different
EU members, in both net and gross terms.
Finally, in order to cover the evolution of inequality during the early years of
the recovery (specifically between 2014 and 2017), Sect. 5 uses EPA and EU-SILC
3 See Household Finance and Consumption Network.
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to update the information on inequality in individual wage income and household
income.
3 Relationship between income, consumption and wealth inequality
in Spain in 2014
This section analyses inequality in Spain in terms of hourly wages, wage income,
household income, consumption and wealth.4 In particular, it examines in depth the
economic decisions and economic policy instruments that generally imply that inequal-
ity is lower when compared in terms of income and consumption and higher when the
focus is on wealth.
Inequality analysis can focus on different variables that are closely interconnected.
For example, there are individual differences in hourly wages, in the ability to obtain
income other than labour income, in access to public goods or in decisions on house-
hold formation, consumption and saving. In general, all these measures are related.
For instance, workers’ wage income is a function of their hourly wage and of the
number of hours they work over a specific period.
In the remaining of this section, earnings’ inequality across workers is analysed in
Sect. 3.1, whereas Sect. 3.2 focuses on inequality across households. In turn, house-
holds’ gross income depends first on the members of the household and how their time
is organised between paid work, housework and leisure.Moreover, wage income is not
the only component of household income, as in addition to income from paid employ-
ment there is income from self-employment and there are unemployment benefits,
pensions and other transfers that serve as a form of social insurance in situations of
hardship. The total sum of all these forms of income is not available for consumption,
as a portion must be deducted for payment of taxes, giving net disposable income.
Lastly, households themselves decide what portion of their net income they wish to
consume, depending among other factors on the level of uncertainty underlying their
future income expectations, their stage of life, their available wealth and the public or
subsidised goods available to them. All income that households decide not to consume
are savings; households’ wealth will vary according to the assets in which they invest
their savings, the price paid and the rate of return obtained.
3.1 Wage income inequality across workers
On average, the wage income of Spanish household members amounts to 60% of the
household’s total annual income, making it a prime candidate for analysis in the study
of inequality. The inequality observed in this variable is analysed below, distinguishing
between inequality stemming from differences in hourly wages and that stemming
from differences in the number of hours worked.
In 2014 hourly wage inequality in Spain was similar to the median of the euro area
countries. Drawing on information by Eurostat, in 2014 the hourly wage of workers
4 Note that this paper addresses inequality and not poverty, which is generally defined as the population
that does not meet a specific income threshold (50% or 60% of median income).
123









FI BE FR MT NL AT IT SI ES LU SK DE UK LV GR IE PT PL
P90/P10  ESES









FI BE SI IT LU FR SK PL GR PT MT ES IE LV AT UK DE NL
P90/P10  ESES
2 INEQUALITY IN MONTHLY EARNINGS 
Fig. 1 International comparison of inequality indicators. Wage earnings (2014). Source: Eurostat (European
Structure of Earnings Survey - SES)
Table 1 Wage earnings
inequality indicators. Source:
INE (EES)






in the ninth decile of the distribution in Spain was 3.3 times higher than that of
those in the first decile. This inequality indicator (the P90/P10 ratio) was close to
the median of the EU countries: below countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Germany
or the United Kingdom, but above France, Belgium and the Nordic countries (see
panel 1 of Fig. 1).
In the case of Spain, hourly wage differences were smaller at the low end of the
distribution. As Table 1 shows, in 2014, while the P90/P10 ratio for hourly wages was
3.3, the P50/P10 ratio was just 1.6. At the high end of the distribution there were larger
differences; specifically the P90/P50 ratio was 2.1.
There are important differences in demographic characteristics across the hourly
wage distribution. A larger proportion of women, young people, workers with low
levels of educational attainment and those with limited tenure are concentrated at
the low end of the distribution. Specifically, panel 1 of Table 2 shows that in 2014
63% of workers with wages in the first decile of the wage distribution are women,
although they account for 48% of all wage-earners. In turn, most of the workers in
this first decile (62%) have no education beyond compulsory schooling, compared
with 43% for all wage-earners. In addition, workers’ age and tenure are higher in
the higher deciles of the wage distribution. This is related to significant hourly wage
differences in Spain by gender, age, level of educational attainment and tenure. Fig-
ure 2 presents the result of a regression model designed to separate the effect of
each such variable on hourly wages. This analysis confirms significant negative wage
differentials for women, young people, new hires and workers with lower levels of
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REAL HOURLY WAGE 2014 (a)
Fig. 2 Wage differentials by socioeconomic groups. a. The values reported in the graph are calculated in
the following way: first, we estimate a Mincer regression of the logarithm of real hourly wages on dummy
variables for gender, age, education, length of service, firm size, working hours and contract type, for
the sample of all wage-earners. The omitted categories in the estimations are: man, age 30–44, primary
education or less, tenure less than 1 year, firm size 10–49, part-time contract and temporary contract. Second,
the estimated wages reported in the graph are calculated as the exponential of the sum of the coefficient
of each of the corresponding dummy variables and the constant term. Sources: INE (EES) and Banco de
España
educational attainment.5 However, the evidence available suggests that hourly wage
differentials between groups are not particularly high compared with other countries
(Simón 2010).
Furthermore, there are interesting facts regarding the contractual conditions of
groups of workers with the lowest hourly wage (panel 2 of Table 2). First, there is a
higher incidence of part-timework among the groups ofworkerswith the lowest hourly
wages. Specifically, the proportion of part-time work is 37% among women, 39%
among young people, 32% amongworkers with lower levels of educational attainment
and 41% among new labour market entrants. Those numbers are much higher than the
incidence of part time in other sociodemographic groups. As a consequence, when the
number of hours worked is considered in the analysis, the differences in wage income
between individuals increase.
Second, young workers and new labour market entrants generally interrupt their
periods of work more often, as they are more dependent on temporary contracts.
There are no substantial differences between men and women or between persons
with different levels of educational attainment on the number of days workers are
not at work—because they are off work, on unpaid leave or laid off—. However,
there are significant differences by age and by tenure. Specifically, according to the
Earnings Structure Survey (EES) data, there are up to five days’ difference in time
actually worked per month between different age groups and between new labour
market entrants and all other workers. All in all, inequality measures are higher when
monthly earnings rather than hourly wages are compared. Taking into account the
number of hours and days worked in the month, in 2014 the wage income of the ninth
5 Similar regressions have beenmadewith annual SpanishLabour Force Survey (EPA)wage data, converted
to monthly, for full-time employees, obtaining similar differentials. Specifically, on the EPA figures, the
differential would be around 17% for women, 22% for young people compared with older workers, 37%
for university graduates compared with workers with only lower secondary education, and 22% for new
hires compared with those with more than 10 years’ tenure.
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decile was 5.6 times higher than that of the first decile whereas, as indicated in the
previous section, in terms of hourly wages this ratio was just 3.3 times (see Table 1).
This increase in inequality is concentrated at the low end of the distribution. Thus,
median wage-earners received 2.5 times more than the first decile in terms of monthly
earnings (1.6 in terms of hourly wages), but they continued to receive slightly less
than half the level of the ninth decile (2.2 in terms of monthly earnings, 2.1 in terms of
hourly wages). Indeed, Spain is one of the countries that shows the largest increase in
inequality when wages are analysed monthly rather than hourly, presenting a degree
of wage income inequality above the median. In this respect, notable increases in
inequality are also observed in other countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and Austria (see panel 2 of Fig. 1), where there is a higher incidence
of short-term and short-hour contracts among the groupswith the lowest hourlywages.
3.2 Income, consumption and wealth inequality across households
3.2.1 Household income
Aswell as income fromwages, individuals receive income from self-employment, cap-
ital income, unemployment benefits, pensions and other, mainly public, transfers that
must be taken into account to analyse inequality. In addition, people do not generally
take decisions in isolation but as members of a household, where different members
may receive income and share the use of certain goods. Accordingly, total household
income inequality must be considered as well as per capita6 income inequality. For
this purpose, we analyse below the EFF data for 2014 on gross per capita income
and total household income, as the overall income of all household members and its
characteristics.
In Spain there is a high correlation between the socioeconomic characteristics of
adult household members. Specifically, the correlation between the educational attain-
ment level of the head of household and his/her partner verges on 70% in Spain (see
panel 1 of Fig. 3). This explains, for example, why when one household member is
unemployed, there is a relatively high probability that the other household member is
unemployed (panel 2 of Fig. 3). In consequence, households have a relatively limited
ability to insure themselves from negative labour market shocks to one partner through
the earnings of the other partner.7
As a result of this high correlation, the differences observed in individual wage
income inequality do not narrow significantly when total household income is con-
sidered. One way to identify how household formation reduces the differences in
householdmembers’ individualwage income is by comparing themeasures of inequal-
ity of individual wage income and household wage income (see the first four columns
of Table 3). If we consider a simulation where couples were formed under a ran-
dommating assignment, inequality in household income would be substantially lower
than inequality in individual income. However, in the case of Spain, the measures of
6 As explained in Appendix 2 per capita variables are calculated using OECD equivalence scale.
7 According to EPA this correlation has been increasing over time and hence the insurance mechanism has
been decreasing over time.
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 HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYED  HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD UNEMPLOYED
%
2 EMPLOYMENT SITUATION OF THE PARTNER OF A HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
THAT IS IN THE LABOUR FORCE (EMPLOYED OR UNEMPLOYED) (b)  
Fig. 3 Assortative mating indicators. a. On EPA data for Q2 of each year. The values are obtained from a
regression of the wife’s education level on that of her partner, dummy variables for the year and interaction
terms between the partner’ s education level and dummyvariables for the year,with the coefficients estimated
from the interaction terms. b. On EPA data for 2017 Q2. Sources: INE (EPA) and Banco de España









Gini 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.43
P90/P10 10.86 9.99 6.25 7.00
P50/P10 4.29 3.96 2.44 2.73
P75/P25 3.00 2.88 2.61 2.96










Gini 0.37 0.39 0.31 0.33 0.68
P90/P10 5.71 6.15 4.00 4.42
P50/P10 2.39 2.56 1.92 2.12
P75/P25 2.37 2.66 1.99 2.20
P90/P50 2.38 2.40 2.08 2.08
P80/P20 15.49
a. Wage income figures exclude zeroes
inequality of household wage income compared with individual wage income are only
slightly lower: specifically, the P90/P10 ratio for individual wage income is 10.9 and
the P90/P10 ratio for household wage income is 10.0.
The bulk of household’s income at the lower end of the per capita household’s
per capita income distribution comes from unemployment benefits and employment
income (seePanel 1 of Fig. 4).At theworst point of the crisis, around70%of the income
of the first decile of the distribution came from unemployment benefits and wage or
self-employment income. Pre-crisis, this figure stood at 50% and included a higher
proportionof pensions andother public transfers, owing to the better relative positionof
wage income and the lower unemployment rate (in any event, unemployment benefits
accounted for approximately 10% of total income in this decile).
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1 PROPORTION OF INCOME SOURCES BY SELECTED
PER CAPITA INCOME PERCENTILE (2014)
SOURCE: Banco de España (EFF).  EMPLOYMENT INCOM  SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME  CAPITAL INCOME  UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS  PENSIONS  OTHER TRANSFERS
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4 INEQUALITY IN TOTAL NET INCOME 
Fig. 5 International comparison of inequality indicators. Household income (2014). Sources: Eurostat
(European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions—EU-SILC—) and European Central Bank
(European Household Finance and Consumption Survey—HFCS—)
Compared to other European countries,8 in Spain, per capita income inequality
is relatively high. As Table 3 shows, the P90/P10 ratio for households’ per capita
income was 6.3 in 2014. Given the abovementioned structure of sources of income,
this is attributable to the higher incidence of unemployment in Spain, which resulted in
a high concentration of households collecting unemployment benefits at the low end of
the distribution. In addition, the fact that the unemployment rate remained high, even
in the most expansionary periods, meant that inequality in gross income per capita
before the crisis was also high in Spain by international standards (panel 1 of Fig. 5).
8 This is according to the EuropeanHousehold Finance andConsumption Survey (HFCS) and the European
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).
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The limited ability to obtain income at the low end of the distribution ismitigated by
the relatively large average household size in Spain. This permits certain economies of
scale in household expenditure. According to the literature, young peoples’ decision to
leave the family home is generally very closely linked to their job stability and, where
there is a high incidence of short-termcontracts, this is generally achieved at a relatively
late age (Matea 2015; Barceló and Villanueva 2016, 2018). Moreover, the fact that
young people are leaving the parental home later conditions the age at which they start
to have children and the number of children they have. In consequence, Spain is one
of the countries where the age of mothers at first birth is the highest and the fertility
rate is the lowest (Adsera 2011). It is also one of the European countries with the
lowest percentage of old people living alone or in institutional households. However,
this is linked, at least in part, to the lower educational level of the older generations
and, therefore, it will foreseeably change in the future in view of the increase in the
level of educational attainment observed since the start of the last century.9
The late age at which young people leave the parental home and the high pension
replacement rate (OECD 2017), among other factors, mean that Spain’s inequality in
total household income is relatively lower, when compared with that of other countries
(panel 3 of Fig. 5). Indeed, the concentration at the low end of the household income
distribution of households with older members that are chiefly supported by pensions
may be explained by these household formation behaviour. Panel 2 of Fig. 4 shows
that, in 2014, more than 50% of incomes in the first decile came from pensions and
other, mainly non-employment, transfers.
Regarding other sources of household’s income, self-employment income and
capital income play a smaller role in explaining differences in inequality levels. Self-
employment income made up 14% of total income within the 9th decile and 7%
within the 1st decile. In turn, capital income amounted to 10% of total income of
the 9th decile, and then decreased progressively for the lower deciles, down to 2%
in the first decile.10 The inequality indicators for market income, which comprises
wage income, self-employment income and capital income, are very similar to those
observed for wage income. However, when imputed income from home ownership is
considered, the inequality between Spanish households becomes slightly narrower, in
terms of total and per capita income. Indeed, imputing income from home ownership
reduces total income inequality (Goerlich 2016). This is because, according to the EFF,
61% of households in the first income decile own their own homes, so their incomes,
which are low without the imputed income, increase considerably when it is added.11
By contrast, in the higher deciles, there is a proportionally lower increase in income
when the imputed income is added, showing that the distribution of imputed income
9 Matea (2015) shows that once educational differences across European countries are taken into account,
there is nomajor difference in the percentage of persons reporting to be household heads among the over-35s.
10 In this case it must be considered that not all assets provide income, so that differences in wealth do not
necessarily translate into differences in income.
11 The EFF does not include information on implicit income from home ownership. However, in order to
analyse the change in inequality if this income is taken into account it has been proxied. Specifically, for
owner-occupier households, the market rent payable for their home is estimated, according to its current
value indicated by the household and the interest rate on housing loans (in the year of the interview), deduct-
ing the housing depreciation cost (using a straight-line depreciation coefficient obtained from information
supplied by the tax authorities).
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from home ownership is considerably more uniform than the distribution of all other
income overall. In particular, if imputed income from home ownership is added to
total household income, inequality measured by the P90/P10 ratio falls from 6.3 to
5.9 in per capita income and from 7.0 to 6.7 in total income in 2014.
Finally, the progressive nature of direct personal taxes reduces inequality. The
Spanish tax system’s progressivity stems, in particular, from the existence of a non-
taxable allowance and rising marginal tax rates in the personal income tax scale. To
analyse the role that direct taxation plays in reducing inequality, the personal income
tax paid by each household has been estimated by deducting tax liabilities from gross
income to give after-tax income.12 As Table 3 shows, net income inequality is lower
than gross income inequality, measured by the Gini index or the income ratio p90/p10.
Specifically, in accordance with the latter indicator, the ratio is 7.0 in gross terms and
6.1 in net terms. The results are the same when per capita income is analysed.
Personal income tax in Spain is slightly less progressive than the OECD average.
One way to compare the degree of progressivity of different personal income tax
systems is by analysing the different tax wedges—the difference between gross and
net income—arising from personal income tax and social security contributions for
different income brackets. According to OECD data, the difference in tax wedge
between persons receiving 167%of their country’s average income and those receiving
67% was 7.8 percentage points in Spain in 2016 compared with 8.1 percentage points
for the average of the OECD countries. Accordingly, direct personal taxation reduces
inequality in terms of gross income per capita by slightly less in Spain than on average
in the OECD countries.
The redistributive nature of a tax system may be determined by differences in the
parameters of other taxes in addition to income tax. However, the redistributive effects
of indirect taxation in Spain (essentially value added tax and excise duties) are low
because progressivity is limited (see Bover et al. 2017). This is not exclusive to the
Spanish tax system and is because indirect taxation rates are essentially proportional
and do not vary according to income. Thus, according to the European Commission,
average effective VAT rates vary only slightly by income deciles in most EU countries
(see Institute for Fiscal Studies 2011).
3.2.2 Household consumption and wealth
The level of inequality and the way in which it evolves is often discussed in terms
of income. However, from the standpoint of utility or well-being, people’s level of
consumption may be more relevant. Consumption aggregates the goods an individual
enjoys directly. As well as being influenced by individuals’ expected income and the
uncertainty surrounding that income, the purchase of these goods is also affected by
wealth, which also determines potential access to external financing, as well as the
point in the life cycle of the members of the household, and their access to public or
subsidised goods (see Attanasio and Pistaferri 2016). In this regard, total consumption
and per capita consumption show less inequality between households than net income
(as Blundell et al. 2008). For example, the P90/P10 ratio for total consumption is 4.4,
12 The parametric function estimates are taken from García-Miralles et al. (2018).
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compared with 6.2 for total net income (see Table 3). This happens at all levels of the
income distribution, irrespective of whether income is measured in total or per capita
terms and of the point in the economic cycle.
The smaller inequality in consumption that is observed partly reflects higher mobil-
ity of income at the tails of the distribution, despite the strong persistence of differences
in the income distribution. The expected course of future income is a fundamental
factor in explaining consumption decisions.13 For its part, households’ expectations
about their future income largely depend on how their income and that of their social
reference group have developed in the past.14 Thus, in any economy where income
mobility is very limited, levels of inequality will be highly persistent. In the case of
Spain, using EFF data, it is found that 58% of households with a low relative income in
2011 (measured as the 20% lowest incomes) remained at this level in 2014,whereas the
remaining 42% improved their relative position.15 Meanwhile, a household’s future
income depends both on the current level of income and any shocks affecting it. Table 4
shows estimates of predictive income distributions, using household income data from
the panel sample of the EFF, where income dynamics varies depending on the house-
holds’ position in the income distribution in the preceding period and the size of the
shock they receive at each age.16 In this regard, according to the evidence shown in
the table, in the face of (very) negative shocks (those in the bottom part of the shock
distribution), the situation of households in the upper part of the income distribution
tends to deteriorate sharply, to a much greater extent than in the case of households in
the lower part of the income distribution. This asymmetry is relevant when analysing
how different households form their income expectations and how these expectations
affect consumption and spending. Specifically, given the effects of adverse shocks on
them, higher income households tend to raise their saving rate. The opposite happens
in the case of lower-income households, whose situation improves significantly in the
event of (very) positive income shocks. That is, such “unusual” shocks are associated
with lower persistence than other shocks and hence have a higher propensity to wipe
13 While not pursued here, income is sometimes decomposed into transitory and permanent components,
and this distinction is potentially relevant because shocks of different durability will be expected to have
different effects on consumption. Indeed, the empirical structural literature tends to find that consumption
growth responds more to permanent income shocks than to transitory income shocks, although in general
households are also able to partially insure permanent shocks [For the US see Blundell et al. (2008), Carroll
(2009), and Kaplan and Violante (2010); for Italy, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010); and for Spain, Casado
(2011)].
14 For evidence of the influence of the social reference group on consumption decisions in Spain, see
Casado (2018).
15 There is a scarcity of comparable data at international level on mobility over time. From the HFCS data
for Germany, it was possible to verify greater mobility in Spain, as over the same period 72.5% of the
German population in the lowest 20% of the income distribution remained in this situation in 2014.
16 As detailed in Basso et al. (2017), those predictive distributions are based on a general first-orderMarkov
process for the logarithm of household income (yit ),for a given household i and age of the household head
t. In particular, the τ conditional quantile of yit , where τ m (0,1), is assumed to be a function of past income,
yit−1, and shocks uit . Formally: yit Qt (yit−1, uit ), (uit |yit−1, yit−2, …)∼Uniform(0, 1). Hence, the
shock uit is a rank. A persistent shock of a magnitude comparable to yit can be constructed, for instance, as
Qt (µt , uit ) where µt is the mean of yit , or as Qt (mt , uit ) where mt is the median of yit . Hence, for a given
percentile of income in the preceding period, τ is a percentile of the distribution of shocks that households
with that level of income receive.
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Table 4 Income persistence by size of the shock and income percentile (a). Source: Banco de España
Shock percentile
5 10 20 50 80 90 95
Income percentile in the preceding period
5 1.09 0.95 0.80 0.58 0.32 0.19 0.08
10 0.98 0.89 0.79 0.65 0.41 0.28 0.22
20 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.50 0.39 0.37
50 0.68 0.65 0.66 0.73 0.60 0.54 0.57
80 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.77
90 0.37 0.34 0.41 0.71 0.73 0.82 0.89
95 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.68 0.77 0.93 1.00
a. Estimates of the derivative with respect to income in t−1 of a flexible income percentile function in t,
given the income in t−1 and age in t, evaluated based on the value of average age for varying sizes of
shock. See Basso et al. (2017)
out the history of past shocks. These dynamics cause significant revenue movements
at the tails of the distribution,17 which is consistent with the evidence that income
inequality exceeds consumption inequality.
The way in which a household’s consumption changes in response to fluctuations in
income also depends on its level ofwealth and, to a lesser extent, the age of itsmembers.
The wealthiest households are better able to maintain their level of consumption in the
face of falling income, given that they may have assets or easier access to borrowing.
Therefore, for these families, consumption will depend to a lesser extent on income
than in other households, at least up to a certain age. Thus, it has been observed that in
households headed by a person under 55 years, the availability of more wealth allows
for more stable consumption, whereas in households headed by a person over 55,
wealth barely plays any role in consumption stabilising. In effect, as Table 5 shows,
the change in average household consumption in response to changes in income is
smaller in wealthier families whose head of household is aged under 55. Specifically,
among households with little relative wealth (at the 5th percentile) and a 30-year-old
head of household, a 1% decrease in income causes a 0.5% drop in consumption,
whereas this decrease is smaller (0.1%) among wealthier households (at the 95th
percentile). However, in households aged over 55 years, the drop in consumption in
response to a drop in income of 1% is always around 0.3%, regardless of the level of
wealth.
Of course, certain public services, such as health and education, have a signifi-
cant redistributive effect in consumption. There is empirical evidence using various
methodological approaches and applying criteria to impute to households the value of
public services provided by general government that shows that these services have
a significant redistributive effect (see Goerlich 2016). In the case of education, for
instance, this is particularly true for preschool and primary education, as well as for
17 For similar patterns in the United States and Norway see Arellano et al. (2017).
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compulsory secondary education, while the effects are less clear in the case of higher
education.18
In terms ofwealth inequality, as shown inTable 3, it greatly exceeds income inequal-
ity. Specifically, the Gini index is 0.68, much higher than observed in other variables
analysed previously and the wealth ratio P80/P20 is 15.5.19 Similarly, the wealthiest
1% own 20% of all wealth and the wealthiest decile holds 52.7% of total wealth.
Income dynamics explain, to some extent, the greater accumulation of wealth by
high-income households. It should be borne inmind that wealth accumulates year after
year, such that differences in wealth increase over time among those households that
maintain their relative income positions. Moreover, as already mentioned, faced with
the risk of a negative shock causing a significant reduction in their income, higher-
income households tend to increase their savings, which is an additional explanatory
factor in the dynamics of wealth inequality.20 However, differences in wealth inequal-
ity derive not only from different saving habits, but also from differences in the
composition of households’ asset portfolios and the evolution of their prices. Own-
ership of assets is widespread, even among low-income brackets. Specifically, 94.3%
of households in the first two income deciles own some kind of asset. However, the
composition of these assets varies significantly with household income. Thus, in the
first two deciles, 89.5% of total assets are associated with real estate property, whereas
this percentage drops to 57.5% in the last decile. Asset holdings by this latter segment
are related to self-employed business (15% total assets), and certain financial assets,
such as shares and participating interests, which represent 11.2% of total assets. If
prices of these assets perform better than those of real estate assets, this would tend
to increase wealth inequality, and vice versa. Recent economic literature has empha-
sised the heterogeneity of access to different assets and their returns to explain the fact
that wealth is more concentrated than income (see Gabaix et al. 2016; Fagereng et al.
2016).
In any event, unlike the case of income or consumption, the level of wealth inequal-
ity in Spain is lower than that in comparable countries. In comparative terms, again
using information from the HFCS, it is observed that, despite the large differences in
household incomes by international standards, Spain has a smaller wealth inequality
(see Fig. 6), which may be related to the fact that there is a widespread concentration
of saving in real-estate assets, even among higher-income households.
18 In any event, in order to analyse the individual benefits deriving from the public provision of a particular
good it is necessary to knowwhat incomegroup spendsmost on that good as a percentageof its total spending.
Those households that spend a larger percentage of their income on the subsidised good will benefit most
from the introduction of a subsidy that does not take factors such as the income level into account. In this
regard, for example, a subsidy on university education that is not proportional to household income would
disproportionately benefit the wealthiest households as their spending on this type of education is higher.
19 As financial and non-financial assets are much more concentrated than employment income, with a non-
negligible fraction of people having no gross wealth or even negative net wealth (debt), wealth inequality
is usually analysed using concentration indices and percentile ratios that do not include information for the
first decile.
20 This behaviour also has significant implications in terms of optimal fiscal policy, which is something
that the economic literature is beginning to analyse. See Basso et al. (2017) and Guner and Yavuz (2017).
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Fig. 6 International comparison of inequality indicators. Household consumption and wealth (2014).
Sources: European Central Bank (European Household Finance and Consumption Survey—HFCS—)
4 Evolution of income, consumption and wealth inequality in Spain
during the crisis (2008–2014)
We analyze the way in which inequality between Spanish households, in terms of their
income, consumption and wealth, has varied over the course of the recent crisis. The
analysis focuses in particular on themechanisms driving up inequality in wage income
and wealth, and on the various economic decisions and economic policy instruments
that cushioned the increase in inequality during this period.
4.1 Wage income inequality across workers
Inequality in terms of hourly earnings remained fairly stable during the crisis, although
there was a marked rise in the inequality in total earnings. Hourly earnings and full
time workers’ monthly earnings were relatively stable during the crisis across the
whole distribution. However, when part-time employees are taken into account and
the analysis period is extended, the increment in wage inequality between 2006 and
2014 becomes significant. Specifically, based on information from the Structure of
Earnings Survey (EES) and the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (MCVL),
over the period, real monthly wages dropped by 30% in the 10th percentile, by 10% at
the median and by 5% in the upper part of the distribution (see Fig. 7). Consequently,
inequality indicators remained unchanged in the case of hourly earnings, while they
grew considerably, particularly in the lower part of the distribution, in the case of total
earnings (see Fig. 7).
The key factor underlying developments in earned income during the crisis was
the strong job destruction, of temporary jobs. Given that this type of contract is more
widespread among young people and lower-qualified workers with low tenure, these
groups were hardest hit by job losses. Thus, as Table 6 shows, between 2006 and 2014,
job destruction profoundly changed the employee composition. The most significant
changes were apparent in the distribution by age, studies and seniority, with a drop of
around 14 pp in the share of workers aged under 30, around 13 pp in that of workers
with an educational attainment of less than post-compulsory secondary education, and
21 pp in that of employees with fewer than three years of tenure in the company. These
groups were generally in the lower part of the wage distribution.
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Fig. 7 Changes in wage earnings 2006–2014 by percentile. Sources: See notes. a. Source: National Statistics
Institute (EES). b. Sources: National Statistics Institute (EES, EPA), Banco de España (EFF) and Ministry
of Employment and Social Security (MCVL). c. Monthly wages calculated from annual wages for indi-
viduals in work at the time of the interview in the same sectors of activity as the EES. d. Monthly wages
calculated from fiscal module for workers working the whole week. e. Monthly wages associated with main
employment in the survey reference week
Table 6 Changes in the characteristics of employees 2006–2014. Source: National Statistics Institute (EES)
Age Education Tenure





2006 24.82 48.75 26.42 52.12 47.88 50.62 49.38
2014 10.74 52.99 36.27 39.46 60.54 29.87 70.13
Relative wage (a)
2006 0.968 0.996 0.989 0.974 1.014 0.975 1.011
2014 0.953 0.987 0.998 0.961 1.007 0.962 1.000
Intra-group inequality (Gini index)
2006 0.200 0.280 0.308 0.214 0.305 0.237 0.295
2014 0.204 0.268 0.294 0.208 0.285 0.252 0.276
a. The relative wage is the ratio between a group’s average monthly wage and the average monthly wage
of the whole population
Moreover, the drop in the number of hoursworkedduring the crisiswas concentrated
in the lower-wage groups. The number of hours worked decreased during the crisis,
mainly because there were more workers on shorter working hours, but also as a result
of their shorter average day and the increase in the number of days without work.
The rise in part-time work particularly affected less qualified junior employees aged
under 30, among whom the rate of part-time work rose by almost 20 pp, irrespective of
gender.As a result, the drop in the number of hoursworked between 2006 and 2014was
particularly marked in the lower part of the wage distribution (see Fig. 8). Constraints
on companies’ ability to change working conditions in sector-wide agreements prior
to the labour-market reform of 2012 meant the bulk of the adjustment requirement fell
on jobs and hours worked (Anghel and Izquierdo 2018).
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Fig. 8 Changes in hours worked 2006–2014. a. Annual gross earnings percentiles, deflated by the CPI. The
average number of hours corresponds to October, which is the EES reference month. Source: National
Statistics Institute (EES, EPA)
Finally, between 2006 and 2014 there was a slight reduction inwage differentials by
age and seniority. This wage compression is probably linked to a greater concentration
ofworkers’wages near theminimum levels set in collective bargaining agreements (see
Díez-Catalán and Villanueva 2014), which is consistent with a drop in extraordinary
payments to those workers earning more than stipulated in the collective bargaining
agreement (see Babecký et al. 2012). The use of the option introduced by the 2012
labour-market reform to unilaterally amend contracts could also explain this wage
compression.
4.2 Income, consumption and wealth inequality across households
4.2.1 Household income
Theway household income per capita developed during the crisiswas largely driven by
job losses and the replacement of wages by unemployment benefits. As a consequence
of the crisis, and mainly as a result of many young people losing their jobs, the lower
part of the per capita income distribution included a larger share of unemployed people
who lost their wage income and started receiving unemployment benefits. Thus, the
youngest and largest households, those with the largest share of their income from
work, and above all from unemployment benefits, joined the 10th percentile of the
per capita income distribution. Income deriving from unemployment benefits in this
percentile, which had been just 8% of per capita income before the crisis, rose to 30%
in 2014, highlighting the importance of these benefits as an insurance mechanism (see
panel 1 and 2 in Fig. 9). To illustrate this, the third panel of Fig. 9 shows the results
of a simulation exercise in which the income of individuals receiving unemployment
benefits was replaced by zero. This simulation shows that unemployment benefits
managed to narrow the increase in market income inequality by a third between 2008
and 2014 compared to a situation in which they did not exist.21 On the other hand, in
the lower part of the per capita income distribution there is also an important fraction
21 This simulation is conducted under the assumption that individuals would not change their behavior in
the labour market.
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Fig. 9 The role of different sources of income. a. Household income adjusted usingOECDequivalence scale.
b. Pension revaluation including safeguard clause from previous year. Sources: Social Security, National
Statistics Institute (EPA) and Banco de España (EFF)
of households receiving pension income and pensions performed more favourably
during the crisis (see panel 4 in Fig. 9).
The per capita income inequality in P90/P10 rose from 5.8 to 6.3, i.e. less than the
rise in individual earnings inequality. Strong job destruction during the crisis caused a
rise in inequality, but thiswas smaller in the lower part of the distribution largely thanks
to public subsidies, benefits and especially pensions. Household per capita income also
dropped across the board, and, as in the case of earned income, households with lower
per capita incomes suffered the biggest drop (see panel 1 of Fig. 10). Thus, 20%
of households with lower per capita incomes suffered losses of over 15%, while the
intermediate percentiles saw reductions of close to 10% and the upper percentiles a
drop close to 5%.
The deterioration in the labour market during the crisis led to a rise in the partic-
ipation rate among household members not previously in the labour force. In effect,
when one of the members of the household was made unemployed, other members
not previously participating in the labour market tended to start looking for work. This
mechanism led to an increase in the female labour force participation rate in the early
years of the crisis, with couples registering as unemployed together. However, most
of the people who joined the labour force were unable to find work. In this regard, as
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Fig. 10 Changes in per capita and total income. Source: Banco de España (EFF)
already discussed, the high correlation between both partners’ socioeconomic charac-
teristics meant that the negative conditions faced by one tended to be similar to those
faced by the other (see Dolado et al. 2017).
Meanwhile, certain changes took place in the formation of households that helped
offset falling incomes in the lower part of the per capita income distribution. There are
various ways in which household formation and composition can change to increase
income, reduce expenditure or benefit from economies of scale. In particular, house-
holdmembers in the workforcemay choose tomigrate abroad or households including
women of childbearing age may change their plans to have children. Additionally,
young people who have finished their education and are making the transition to work-
ing life may decide to postpone setting up home, while adults with family members
on more stable incomes may decide to form a household together.
A marked drop in the birth rate has been observed since 2008, starting to recover
slightly only in 2014. According to the INE, the number of births in Spain, which
was already low by international standards, dropped from 44.7 children per thousand
women of childbearing age to 39.1. The biggest drop in the fertility rate was in house-
holds in the percentile below the median per capita income, remaining constant in the
higher percentiles, suggesting that this mechanism helped adjust spending for some
low-income households.22
An increase in emigration abroad by some or all members of households of for-
eign nationality was observed as well. Thus, outflows of foreign nationals rose from
250,000 in 2008 to its maximum of 450,000 in 2013, such that the percentage of for-
eigners in the population declined from 11.1% in January 2008 to 9.5% in January
2017. Emigration also rose among the Spanish population, increasing from 30,000
individuals in 2008 to 95,000 at the height of the crisis. Emigration by the Spanish
population was concentrated in the better qualified segments, meaning that emigration
was not an option for those with lower qualifications seeking to improve their income
(see Grogger and Hanson 2011; Izquierdo et al. 2016).
In parallel, young people delayed setting up home, breaking the previous trend. As
Fig. 11 shows, the probability of young people aged 18–35 living with their parents
22 The INE does not provide information about the socioeconomic characteristics of women who have had
children, although it is possible to calculate the approximate fertility rate from the number of children less
than 1 year old in households that include women of childbearing age from the EFF in order to analyse how
this rate varies across household per capita income percentiles.
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Fig. 11 Real insurance mechanisms available to households. a. Coefficients of the year dummy variable
from a regression of the probability that an individual in the indicated age group lives with his/her parents,
controlling for gender, age and educational level. EPA data for second quarter of each year (2002–2017).
Reference year 2017. On average, within the period considered 50% of individuals aged 18–35 were living
with their parents. This percentage falls to 8% when those aged 35–49 are considered. Source: National
Statistics Institute (EPA)
had decreased since 2002. However, as of 2008 this downward trend was reversed,
with a return to values similar to those of 2005. In particular, the change in trend
was more pronounced among unemployed young people and those without university
qualifications.
Finally, there was a very slight tendency for some families to consolidate the house-
hold so that some families could benefit from the greater stability of their parents’
pensions. Between 2008 and 2014 there was a modest increase in the proportion of
adults over 35 living with their parents, although the increase was strongest among
unemployed adults.
Given these developments, the change in total household income in the lower per-
centiles was primarily driven by changes in pensions. As discussed before, a typical
household in the lower part of the total income distribution is mainly supported by
income from retirement pensions and other transfers, such as survivors’ pensions.
In this connection, average pensions progressed much more favourably than wage
income over the course of the crisis (see panel 2 of Fig. 10).
Thus, the smaller relative weight of wage income for lower-income households
reduced total income inequality. As panel 2 of Fig. 10 shows, total income fell
across the board, but unlike the case of individual wage income discussed above,
lower-income households’ income performed better than that of households in higher
percentiles. Specifically, percentiles below 20% suffered a drop of less than 10%, and
in some cases almost no drop at all, while those in higher percentiles, which were
more dependent on developments in wage income, saw their total income fall by at
least 15%. Total household income inequality dropped from 8.2 to 7.0 on the P90/P10
indicator.
Net household income fell by somewhat more than gross income among higher-
income families between 2008 and 2014, given the fact that personal income tax was
mademore progressive during this period.As can be seen in Fig. 12, this changemainly
reflects the effect of modifications to personal income tax, for the most part starting
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Fig. 12 Changes in net income by percentile. Sources: See notes. a. Source: Banco de España (EFF). b.
Source: García-Miralles et al. (2018): “The Spanish Personal Income Tax: Facts and Parametric Estimates,”
mimeo
in 2012 with a considerable rise in marginal rates, particularly affecting the upper
segment of the income distribution.23 The second panel of Fig. 12 shows estimated
personal income tax for households in 2007 and 2013, indicating bigger growth in this
period in the average rate paid by higher-income taxpayers, with a minor or negligible
change for taxpayers in the lower part of the income distribution. As a consequence,
the inequality of the distribution increased somewhat less in terms of net income than
gross income.24
4.2.2 Household consumption and wealth
Inequality in both per capita consumption and income increased during the crisis. Per
capita consumption suffered a decrease qualitatively similar to that in per capita income
across the whole distribution (see panel 1 Fig. 13). The losses were most significant
in the percentiles below 20% with drops in per capita consumption of almost 15%.
Households in the 80th percentile and above registered losses of approximately 5%,
whereas the intermediate percentiles were situated close to 10%. Overall, per capita
consumption inequality rose across the whole distribution, as it did in the case of per
capita income.
The biggest changes in consumption were in durable goods for households with
lower per capita consumption. One mechanism households can use to insure against
negative shocks is to delay the purchase of durable goods such as cars or household
equipment. In Panel 2 of Fig. 13 shows how, during the crisis, in the lowest percentiles
of per capita consumption, the drop in total consumption of goods exceeded that
observed for non-durable consumption.
Meanwhile, developments in total income passed through to total consumption,
albeit dampened, cushioning changes in levels of inequality in terms of consumption
23 For example, the marginal rate on the general tax base increased between 4 and 7 pp for taxpayers
earning more than e53,407.2, while it rose by up to 3 pp for taxpayers on lower incomes.
24 During this period the most significant changes to indirect taxation were an increase in the general VAT
rate from 16 to 21% and the lower rate from 7 to 10%. These changes were mainly intended to increase tax
collection, with changes in the composition of this tax being marginal, such that the redistributive potential
from the measures was minimal.
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Fig. 13 Change in consumption by percentile and type of goods consumed. Source: Banco de España (EFF)
spending. Specifically, as shown in Panel 3 of Fig. 13, households in the percentiles
below 20% of consumption spending suffered a decline in consumption of up to 10%,
while households close to and above themedian suffered a reduction of up to 14%. The
inequality in total consumption dropped slightly in the lower part of the consumption
distribution, while remaining virtually unchanged above the median.
Finally, wealth inequality grew significantly during the crisis. The Gini index for
net wealth rose by almost a tenth of a percent over the period from 2008 to 2014, after a
period in which it had remained stable (see Fig. 14). This increase in wealth inequality
is also confirmed with other concentration measures. The proportion of net wealth
corresponding to the wealthiest 1%, 5% and 10% increased during the period. Thus,
10% of the population with the most wealth accumulated 44% of total net household
wealth in 2008, a percentage that rose to almost 53% in 2014. Similarly, the percentage
of net wealth of the wealthiest 5% of the population increased by 8 pp over the period
2008–2014, while the percentage of net wealth of the wealthiest 1% of the population
increased by 5 pp.
The increase in wealth inequality was due to various factors. First of all, the average
value of real assets, which are those in which the lower part of the income distribution
holds most of its wealth, fell between 2008 and 2014 by more than 30%, while that
of financial assets, mainly owned by the upper part of the wealth distribution, even
rose in value. Moreover, the prudential saving of higher-income households, already
mentioned, should be noted. Finally, in the lower-income segment there was a drop
in the percentage of households purchasing real estate assets. Specifically, whereas
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Fig. 14 Wealth inequality indicators. Source: Banco de España (EFF)
in 2008 78% of households in the first two income deciles were homeowners, this
percentage had dropped to 67% by 2014, in contrast with the decline in this percentage
in the ninth decile, which was just 3 pp.
5 Evolution of income inequality in Spain during the recent years
(2014–2017)
Given that from 2013 Q4 Spain’s economy started to recover from the recession, post-
ing a high rate of employment growth which continues to date, analysing the changes
in inequality in recent years is particularly relevant. The latest available year of the
Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF) and the Structure of Earnings Survey
(EES) is 2014. Therefore, there is no up-to-date information on changes in hourly earn-
ings, consumption and wealth inequality in Spain. However, other statistical sources
can be used to analyse recent changes in earnings inequality (up to 2016, using Labour
Force Survey data) and in total gross and net income per capita inequality (up to 2017,
using data from the Spanish Survey on Income and Living Conditions—ECV—).
As seen in Table 7, the measures of inequality in monthly earnings for full-time
employees, which would approximate the behaviour of hourly earnings, remained
largely stable. Thus, the P90/P10 ratio stood at 3.4 during the 2014–2016 period, only
0.1 pp above the value in 2008. This stability extends to all levels of income across
the distribution. When part-time employees are included, the reduction in inequality
during the early years of the recovery was more significant, since the P90/P10 ratio
decreased from 5.1 in 2014 to 4.7 in 2016. This change, which was more significant
at the bottom part of the wage distribution, almost unwound half of the increase in
inequality observed during the crisis.
As regards gross household per capita income, inequality measured by the P90/P10
ratio declined during the 2014–2016 period from 6.3 to 6.1, recovering in this case
a small share of the increase built up over the course of the crisis, although it must
be noted that in this case earnings refer to 2015. However, in 2016 the P90/P10 ratio
returned to the 2014 value of 6.3. Looking at the different parts of the per capita
income distribution, we see that the evolution of inequality was stable over the period
2014–2017.
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Table 7 Indicators of earnings and income inequality during the recovery period. Source: INE (Spanish
Labour Force Survey and Survey of Income and Living Conditions)





2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Gini 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.32
P90/P10 3.43 3.49 3.38 5.12 4.67 4.67
P50/P10 1.72 1.69 1.69 2.45 2.25 2.25
P75/P25 1.92 1.91 1.89 2.15 2.10 2.10
P90/P50 2.00 2.06 2.00 2.09 2.08 2.08
2 Indicators of inequality in gross and net household income (a)
Gross household income per capita Net household income per capita
2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017
Gini 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34
P90/P10 6.30 6.34 6.07 6.35 5.40 5.45 5.28 5.35
P50/P10 2.65 2.68 2.57 2.71 2.56 2.60 2.53 2.56
P75/P25 2.63 2.59 2.61 2.64 2.29 2.27 2.30 2.33
P90/P50 2.37 2.36 2.36 2.35 2.11 2.09 2.09 2.09
Total gross household income Total net household income
2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017
Gini 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
P90/P10 7.20 7.20 7.17 7.38 6.23 6.26 6.00 6.26
P50/P10 2.79 2.79 2.80 2.92 2.65 2.69 2.60 2.72
P75/P25 2.92 2.86 2.90 2.95 2.67 2.60 2.66 2.69
P90/P50 2.58 2.58 2.56 2.54 2.35 2.33 2.31 2.30
a. Household income per capita and consumption per capita are adjusted using the OECD equivalence scale.
Income in 2014 euro
Likewise, the P50/P10 ratio for net income per capita remained at 2.6 over the
period 2014–2017. In this case, the reduction of unemployment for the less-educated
was especially slow in the first few years of the recovery, which limited the decline
in the inequality indices. In addition, as a result of the greater presence of precarious
employment at the low end of the distribution, inequality indicators decline less in
the income per capita statistics than in the wage statistics. This is mainly because,
similarly to the case of the EFF, the ECV sample is representative of all the population
(including individuals who are employed, unemployed and inactive at the time of the
survey), whereas the EES sample is restricted to individuals who have been at work
throughout the month of October of the year of reference. Therefore, the impact of
precarious employment is better reflected in the ECV.
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Finally, despite the fact that inequality in per capita income did not change much
during the recovery, it is noteworthy that inequality in total household income was
lower in 2017 (and 2014) than in 2008, especially at the lower end of the distribution.
6 Conclusions
The recent economic crisis caused a marked rise in wealth and income inequality
indicators in many OECD countries, including Spain. The economic literature has
identified multiple channels through which inequality can affect economic growth by
conditioning individuals’ planned investment in physical and human capital. Under-
standing the causes and consequences of inequality, however, requires an analysis of
the various relevant dimensions of this concept (wages, household income, consump-
tion and wealth).
The analysis in this paper highlights the narrow wage dispersion in Spain while the
high unemployment rate leads to a high level of inequality in terms of gross per capita
income. Differences between employees’ hourly wages in Spain are not particularly
large by international standards, and did not rise during the crisis. By contrast, there
was a very significant rise in unemployment and a reduction in the number of hours
actually worked. This primarily affected lower-income groups, and so considerably
increased inequality in wage income and households’ per capita gross income. In
general, the high unemployment rate implies that the level of gross income inequality
in Spain is high compared to other countries, even during economic booms.
In Spain the level of inequality is lower when total household gross income is
analysed and it decreased during the crisis as a result of public pensions evolving
more favourably than wages. Various factors underlie the lower inequality observed
in terms of households’ total gross income, such as large average household sizes in
Spain. This is partly due to young people tending to live with their parents for longer,
and the fact that pensioners, who usually live in households with fewer members, are
overrepresented at the bottom end of the income distribution. Consequently, the fact
that average pensions evolved much more favourably than earnings over the course of
the crisis reduced total household income inequality.
Inequality in per capita consumption rose during the crisis, particularly as a result
of the drop in spending on durable goods. Consumption inequality is generally lower
than income inequality. Also, developments in total income inequality over the past
downturn were smoothed out in consumption to some extent.
Wealth inequality exceeds income inequality and increased over the course of the
crisis, although Spain’s wealth inequality is moderate by international standards. The
fact that wealth inequality exceeds income equality is partly a result of high-income
households saving more. Differences in the asset portfolios held by different popu-
lation strata, in terms of asset types and their rates of return, are also important in
understanding inequalities in wealth and how they have evolved. In particular, the fact
that real assets (primarily housing) are a significant part of household wealth across
the whole distribution helps keep wealth inequality in Spain low by international
standards. Meanwhile, the ownership of financial assets by the highest income group
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drove up inequality between 2008 and 2014, given that returns on financial assets
outperformed those on real-estate assets.
Changes in inequality during the recent economic recovery suggest that the falling
unemployment rate has narrowed inequality in wage income and per capita income.
As happened during the crisis, both per capita and household consumption inequality
followed changes in income, although somewhat less intensely. In particular, a recov-
ery in consumption at the bottom end of the distribution is foreseeable. Lastly, the
recovery in the value of real-estate assets in recent years should have helped temper
wealth inequality.
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AND HIGH REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 
ARE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE, 
INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY
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2008 AND 2014 IN WAGE AND PER 
CAPITA INCOME AND IN WEALTH. 
LIMITED CHANGE IN HOURLY WAGES, 
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Spain's ho urly wage differential
is similar to  the average o f the EU 
countries.
Once ho urs wo rked are taken into  
acco unt, inequality increases in Spain 
in co mpariso n with other EU co untries 
since gro ups with lo w wages have a 
sho rter average wo rking day.
Per capita inco me inequality is high in 
Spain o wing to  high unemployment. 
The large ho useho ld size and high 
pensio n replacement rates reduce 
to tal inco me inequality.
Direct taxes reduce inco me inequality 
between ho useho lds, although less so  
than in o ther countries.
Individuals try to  cushio n income 
fluctuatio ns so  as to  limit changes
in co nsumption.
Agents have different fo rms o f saving 
and investing, so  wealth inequality is 
high, but the high level o f ho me 
o wnership in Spain means that it
is lo w in terms o f internatio nal 
co mpariso n.
No majo r changes inrelative ho urly 
wages in the different gro ups in 
Spain, by co ntrast to  o ther co untries 
where wage differentials have tended 
to  widen in past decades.
The number o f ho urs worked amo ng
the gro ups with lo wer wages 
decreased in the perio d, resulting
in a significant dro p in their income 
and greater inequality.
The develo pments in the pensio n system 
and unemplo yment benefits 
and the increase in ho usehold size
managed to  check the gro wth in 
ho useho ld income inequality. 
Tax changes raised marginal rates 
fro m 2012, especially at the high end
o f the distributio n, restraining growth
in net income inequality.
Changes in co nsumption inequality
were smaller than changes in inco me 
and wealth inequality.
Inequality ro se during the crisis, 
especially o wing to the decline in 
prices o f real assets co mpared with 
financial assets.
CONCLUSIONS 
ACCORDING TO THE LEVELS OF  
THE DIFFERENT VARIABLES
CONCLUSIONS ACCORDING TO THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE DIFFERENT 
VARIABLES BETWEEN 2008 AND 2014
FACTORS LINKING 
THE VARIABLES VARIABLES
BETWEEN 2014 AND 2016, WAGE 
INCOME INEQUALITY FELL, AS DID 
INCOME PER CAPITA INEQUALITY, 
ALBEIT MORE MODERATELY
Fig. 15 Income, consumption andwealth inequality: relationship between thevariables andmain conclusions
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Appendix 3
Indicators of inequality with other databases
In this appendix we calculate the indicators of inequality for earnings and income,
using two different data sources: the Labour Force Survey (EPA) for earnings and
the Spanish Survey on Income and Living Conditions (ECV) for total gross and net
income. Table 9 shows that the changes inferred from these surveys coincide with
those documented by the EES and the EFF for the period 2008–2014.
Table 9 Indicators of earnings
and income inequality during the
recovery period. Source: INE
(Spanish Labour Force Survey
and Survey of Income and
Living Conditions)







2008 2014 2008 2014
Gini 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.33
P90/P10 3.27 3.43 4.24 5.12
P50/P10 1.58 1.72 2.04 2.45
P75/P25 1.83 1.92 1.91 2.15
P90/P50 2.07 2.00 2.08 2.09






2008 2014 2008 2014
Gini 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.35
P90/P10 5.27 6.30 4.54 5.40
P50/P10 2.30 2.65 2.17 2.56
P75/P25 2.46 2.63 2.22 2.29





2008 2014 2008 2014
Gini 0.4 0.4 0.37 0.38
P90/P10 7.6 7.2 6.42 6.23
P50/P10 3.1 2.8 2.86 2.65
P75/P25 2.9 2.9 2.62 2.67
P90/P50 2.4 2.6 2.25 2.35
a. Household income per capita
and consumption per capita are
adjusted using the OECD
equivalence scale. Income in
2014 euro
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